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In World War I the Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, hoped to create a broad
market for government bonds, the famous Liberty Loans, by following an aggressive policy of
"capitalizing patriotism." He called on everyone from Wall Street bankers to the Boy Scouts to
volunteer for the campaigns to sell the bonds. He helped recruit the nation's best known artists to
draw posters depicting the contribution to the war effort to be made by buying bonds, and he
organized giant bond rallies featuring Hollywood stars such as Douglas Fairbanks, Mary Pickford,
and Charlie Chaplin. These efforts, however, enjoyed little success. The yields on the Liberty bonds
were kept low mainly by making the bonds tax exempt and by making sure that a large proportion
of them was purchased directly or indirectly by the Federal Reserve. Patriotism proved to be a weak
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1. The Liberty Bonds
1 
  When World War I began the Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, 
turned initially to the record of Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury, Samuel Chase, for 
lessons on how to finance a major war.
2 In the end, however, McAdoo rejected Chase’s 
methods. To start with, McAdoo believed that Chase had made a major error in turning 
over the marketing of the government’s securities to a private firm, Jay Cooke and 
Company. McAdoo would make no such mistake. He expected bankers, insurance 
executives, and ordinary citizens to donate their services to the government. Moreover, 
while he acknowledged that Jay Cooke and Company had succeeded to some degree in 
marketing bonds to middle class Americans, McAdoo thought that he could push 
Cooke’s policy much further. Britain and Germany had already undertaken noisy 
“drives” aimed at selling bonds, especially to middle class and working class investors, 
Noyes (1926, 181-2). And McAdoo enthusiastically adopted the same strategy. 
  McAdoo crisscrossed the country on an exhausting speaking tour urging the 
public to express its support for the war by buying bonds, and he arranged rallies at 
                                                 
1 We must thank our colleagues, Michael Bordo and Eugene White, and Kim Oosterlinck, 
who was visiting Rutgers while we were working on this paper, for numerous helpful 
discussions of war finance. We must also thank the participants in a session at the 
American Economic Association meetings in the of Fall 2004, and in particular our 
discussant Paul Rhode and the chair of the session Gavin Wright, for their comments. 
Martha Olney patiently explained the 1917-1919 survey of family saving to us. 
Subsequent seminars at New York University at a seminar organized by Richard Sylla,  
and at Pompeu Fabra University at a seminar organized by Hans-Joachim Voth and Allan 
Taylor, were also very helpful.  
 
2 David M. Kennedy (2004, 100) suggests that McAdoo turned to Chase’s experience, 
rather than to that of our European allies and enemies, because of “an almost instinctual 
sense of the uniqueness of American society.” But this only accounts for the direction in 
which McAdoo’s thoughts initially ran.    4 
which movie stars such as Douglas Fairbanks, Mary Pickford, and Charlie Chaplin 
exhorted the crowd to buy bonds. (Kennedy 1980, 105). In the closing week of the 
campaign for the Fourth Liberty loan $4,800,000 was raised from an audience at 
Carnegie Hall who heard Enzo Caruso and other stars perform (Noyes 1926, 185). But it 
wasn't just stars. Everyone who could, was asked to sell bonds. The Boy Scouts were 
enlisted under the slogan “Every Scout to Save a Soldier.” Even the names of the bonds 
reflected the emphasis on patriotism. While one of the most popular Civil War issues was 
known prosaically as the 5-20 (callable after 5 years, redeemed at 20), the World War I 
debt consisted of four “Liberty loans,” and a final issue of “Victory loans” after the 
armistice.  
  The campaign attempted to create strong social pressures to buy bonds. When, for 
example, the Comptroller of the Currency learned that a national bank charter had been 
granted to six applicants from a “certain western state” who had between them bought 
only $200 worth of Liberty bonds, the charter was revoked. (Whittlesey 1950, 175).    
Much of the campaign to sell the Liberty Bonds was developed by the 
government’s Committee on Public Information created on April 13, 1917. Its Division 
of Pictorial Publicity, created on April 22, produced many of the famous Liberty Bond 
Posters. The Division was headed by Charles Dana Gibson, who’s “Gibson’s Girls” had 
become an American icon. Gibson explicitly rejected an appeal to the material side of 
American life and believed that “war art ‘must appeal to the heart,’” Vaughn (1980, 150). 
As the war wore on the emphasis shifted toward greater reliance on emotional 
appeals. The campaign to sell the Fourth Liberty loan, although making some appeals to 
financial self-interest, explicitly emphasized the bestiality of the Germans. It is not   5 
always clear which posters were put out by official government agencies. But one poster 
issued by the Division of Advertising of the Committee for Public Information for the 
Fourth loan showed German soldiers abusing women and children in Belgium and argued 
that “Such a civilization is not fit to live,” Vaughn (1980, 165) Another official poster for 
the Fourth loan, “Remember Belgium,” showed a German soldier bayoneting an 
obviously defenceless woman. The caption explained that “You can floor an Uhlan 
[lancer] with lead, but only gold can floor Berlin” and that “You can overwhelm the mad 
Wolf of Wilhelmstrasse with the crushing wrath of billions,” Vaughn (1980, 166). 
  Four examples of the famous Liberty loan posters are reproduced below. The first 
three rely on emotional appeals. The third in particular may be the sort of thing that 
Warren Harding, then a Senator from Ohio, had in mind when he complained that the 
campaign for the First Liberty loan was “hysterical and unseemly.”
3 The fourth poster, on 
the other hand, shows an appeal to self interest.  
  We are unlikely to witness anything like the Liberty Bonds again. True, there was 
a brief flurry of interest in issuing war bonds after the 9/11 attacks. Both houses of 
Congress passed legislation that would have created “Freedom Bonds.” The 
administration, however, although sympathetic with sentiment behind the legislation, was 
opposed to issuing freedom bonds because the United States was in a recession. 
Encouraging saving, the administration believed, would be counterproductive. The 
Treasury did inscribe a variation of its standard EE Savings Bonds as “Patriot Bonds.”
4 
But interest in Freedom bonds or Patriot bonds faded quickly.  
                                                 
3  New York Times, June 19, 1917, p. 3. 
4 See The New York Times, October 26, 2001, p. C7, and December 2, 2001, p. BU6.   6 
  The broader question, however, of whether social pressures can be used to 
supplement financial incentives is a hardy perennial. It is therefore worth knowing how 
effective the campaigns really were. What price, to put it differently, were investors 
willing to pay to help make the world safe for democracy?  
Historians have generally viewed the campaigns as successful. Indeed, the 
apparent success of irrational emotional appeals during the war convinced many 
observers, such as the influential columnist Walter Lippman, of the basic irrationality of 
the public, Vaughn (1980, 191). Historians also see the effort to sell bonds to the middle 
and working classes as a uniquely successful effort that, unfortunately, helped prepare the 
way for the stock market boom and crash of the 1920s by teaching people how to invest 
in stocks and bonds. 
In short, the campaign to sell the Liberty bonds provides a unique natural 
experiment in which to examine the powers and the limits of non-pecuniary social 
pressures. 
    
2. Taxes, Bonds, or Greenbacks? 
  To put the Liberty bonds and the campaigns to sell them into perspective, and 
explain why they came to have a leading role in the financing of the war, it is useful to 
briefly recount the contemporary debate over how to finance the war. It would take us too 
far afield to go over all the arguments made within the Administration, within Congress, 
and in the press that influenced the choices finally made. However, we can get a good 
idea of how contemporaries viewed the issues if we look at the debate among the leading 
economists over the best method of financing the war.     7 
  There are economists knew, three ways to finance a war – taxes, borrowing, and 
printing money. There was general agreement that printing money was wrong because it 
would produce inflation.
5 The Civil War, and the experience in other wartime economies, 
had revealed the danger of the printing press. Printing money was at best a stopgap to be 
used until an appropriate means of finance could be put in place. But the choice between 
taxes and borrowing was far from obvious.   
  The economists of 1917 were acutely aware, moreover, that they were the heirs to 
a tradition, the “classical” or “English” tradition, which favored taxes over borrowing. As 
originally set out by David Hume (1970 [1752], 91-2)
6 and Adam Smith (1979 [1776], 
919-20) the case for taxes was political rather than economic. Smith’s splendid and 
timely statement of the case is worth quoting.  
  The ordinary expense of the greater part of modern governments in time of 
peace being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when war comes 
they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to 
the increase of their expense. They are unwilling for fear of offending the 
people, who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be 
disgusted with the war; and they are unable from not well knowing what 
taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of 
borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and 
inability would otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing they are enabled, 
with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year, money 
sufficient for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetually funding 
they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise 
annually the largest possible sum of money.  
 
                                                 
 
5 Many economists made a sharp distinction between loans financed by money creation 
and loans financed by sales to the general public. Wilson and McAdoo, however, seem to 
have believed that loan finance in general was inflationary. Wilson warned against the 
inflationary dangers from relying entirely on loan finance in his war message of April 2, 
1917, Noyes (1927, 197-8).  
  
6 Although Hume’s essay first appeared in 1752, the argument against bond-finance was 
not included until an edition published in 1770.   8 
In this passage Smith goes on to explain how bond-finance encourages war by hiding the 
true costs of war. 
In great empires the people who live in the capital, and in the provinces 
remote from the scene of action, feel, many of them, scarce any 
inconveniency from the war; but enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of 
reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and armies. To 
them this amusement compensates the small difference between the taxes 
which they pay on account of the war, and those which they had been 
accustomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly dissatisfied with the 
return of peace, which puts an end to their amusement, and to a thousand 
visionary hopes of conquest and national glory from a longer continuance of 
the war. 
 
   
  Later economists in the classical school maintained the antipathy toward 
borrowing, although John Stuart Mill, as might be expected, took a more moderate 
stance. Mill emphasized the dangers of borrowing, but thought that some borrowing 
would be acceptable. The interest rate would show whether borrowing had been held to a 
prudent level: an increase in interest rates would be the sign that borrowing had reached 
an excessive level. (Mill, 1940 [1848], 873-6).  
   On the eve of American entrance into the war, Oliver M.W. Sprague – a professor 
at Harvard and one of America's leading monetary economists – was given the task of 
discussing the optimal means of financing a major war at the annual meetings of the 
American Economic Association. Sprague, in line with the classical tradition, made a 
strong case for taxation. Borrowing, according to Sprague, was unjust.  
The injustice of treating those who furnish the funds for war more 
generously than those who risk life itself will not be questioned. Consider 
for a moment the contrast under the borrowing method of war finance of a 
soldier in receipt of an income of $2500 before a war and his neighbor who 
remains at home in continued receipt of a similar amount. The civilian 
reduces his expenditures in every possible way and subcribes a total of 
$4000 to war loans. He is rewarded with a high rate of interest to which his   9 
soldier neighbor must contribute his quota in higher taxes if he is fortunate 
enough to return from the front. (Sprague 1917, 204) 
 
Would high taxes reduce output?  
 
Taxation on this onerous scale [sufficient to finance s major war] would 
virtually eliminate the ordinary economic motives for effort and sacrifice. 
What would be the effect on production? There is no experience whatsover 
on which to base a judgment. I venture to think, however, that no serious 
difficulties would be encountered when millions of men were fighting in the 
trenches in a great war in which a people believed that its vital interests were 
at stake.(Sprague 1917, 208).  
 
In other words, Sprague recognized that high taxes might discourage effort, but thought 
that this effect could be offset during a war by patriotism. Four leading economists 
commented on Sprague’s paper, (Miller, Lutz, Lincoln, Urdahl, and Sprague, 1917). In 
general, Sprague’s discussants agreed that tax-finance was best. Miller, however, worried 
that relying entirely on taxes would weaken the “motive to industry.”
7 
  At a conference held a few months later (and after the declaration of war and the 
passage of the War Revenue Act) one can find more acceptance of the need to borrow. 
Edwin R.A. Seligman (1918) thought that taxes should be raised, but that possible 
adverse effects on consumption and investment should be kept in mind. For Seligman 
financing 25 or 35 percent through taxes was about right. Even Sprague (1918) 
recognized that the war was going to be financed mainly (perhaps 75 percent) by debt 
whatever he or other economists might say. But he still believed that it would have been 
                                                 
7 Henry C. Adams (1918) agreed that a balance had to be struck between taxation and borrowing, a position 
based on a much earlier study of the War of 1812 and the Civil War, (Adams 1886).   10 
better to finance it 75 percent by taxes. Greater reliance on taxes would have reduced 
consumption and speeded conversion.
 8 
  The debates among the economists were echoed by the debates among the public. 
The socialists thought that all of the war could be financed by the appropriation of all 
incomes over $10,000 per year. The Wall Street Journal, as might be expected, advocated 
reducing the income tax exemption from $4000 to $1000. The Journal thought that 
considerable reliance should be placed on bonds. It was a matter of equity: “It is not right 
that the present generation should bear the whole burden of a conflict fought for the 
freedom of our children’s children.”
9 
  McAdoo rejected the extreme view that all of the war should be financed by 
taxes. He saw a trade-off between taxes and bonds: excessive reliance on taxation would 
frighten the wealthy and reduce support for the war; excessive reliance on bonds would 
be inflationary. Given this tradeoff, the practical matter became one of naming the 
optimal percentage to be financed by each. McAdoo, according to his Memoirs, initially 
thought that a 50-50 split was about right. J.P. Morgan, America’s leading investment 
banker, when questioned by McAdoo, advised financing 20 percent through taxes. Later 
McAdoo thought that financing 33 percent through taxes would do.  
  Davis Rich Dewey (1931, 506-7) summed up the outcome of the debate this way. 
Some indeed advocated a policy of “pay as you go” and even proposed a 
conscription of wealth, if necessary to meet the war costs. Others favored a 
more equal division between taxes and loans. These views, however, did not 
prevail. There was fear of “frightening capital” and arousing popular 
                                                 
8 In recent years the classical fear of debt finance has eroded further. Following the lead of Robert 
J. Barro (1987, 1989) economists tend to emphasize the advantages of smoothing taxes over time 
through the use of debt. 
 
9 This paragraph including the quotation from the Journal is based on Kennedy (2004, 
16-17).    11 
discontent which would retard the progress of military and naval plans. 
Although no exact ratio was formally adopted. There slowly developed an 
accepted conviction that taxation should provide at least one-third of the costs 
of the war. 
 
As it turned out, about 25 percent of the war was financed through taxation. 
 
  When it came to practical details about what the types of instruments to market 
and how to market them, the economists were less helpful, although they did offer some 
advice. Arthur Cecil Pigou was the leading British economist of the day, after Marshall. 
After the war Pigou (1941 [1921], 92-4) offered what he considered to be three decisive 
objections to allowing interest rates to increase in wartime. (1) Higher rates, in particular 
rates that rise above rates in enemy countries, might be seen as a sign of weakness. (2) 
Higher rates might not stimulate much additional savings, and in any case would store up 
problems for future finance ministers. (3) Higher rates, like loans themselves, may be 
viewed as inequitable, as allowing the rich to “make a good thing out of war.”  It seems 
likely that concerns such as these, although not necessarily derived from economists, 
explain the determined effort made in the United States and in Britain to keep rates down 
during the war and to disguise increases. 
  Irving Fisher was perhaps the leading American economist of the day, certainly 
the one that we know best. Fisher (1918) accepted the need for issuing bonds, and made 
three points about how patriotic citizens should respond. (1) People should buy them by 
reducing their own consumption, not by borrowing from banks. (2) People should hold 
them, and not resell them unless the need was strong. (3) It was important that poor 
people invest in bonds so that after the war we wouldn’t be in the position of taxing the 
poor in order to pay the interest and principal on bonds owned by the rich. All of these 
points were stressed in the Liberty bond campaigns.   12 
 
3. Issuing the Liberty Bonds 
  There were, as shown in Table 1, four issues of Liberty bonds during the war, and 
one issue of Victory bonds afterwards. McAdoo might have chosen to sell bonds 
continuously. In other words, he might have simply opened the bond selling window of 
the Treasury and urged the public to buy bonds, as was done for short-term instruments in 
the United States, and as was done for longer-term instruments in France. McAdoo chose, 
however, to offer the bonds in separate blocks. The Treasury announced in advance the 
amount to be offered. Then on a particular day the subscription books were opened and 
offers for the bonds were accepted or rejected. This system allowed the Treasury to create 
public drives for the bonds and use patriotism to whip up enthusiasm. Would American 
people show their support for the war by buying all of the bonds? Each region of the 
country, moreover, was given a quota, creating a basis for additional competition. Which 
region of the country would be the most patriotic and exceed its quota the most? 
  Perhaps the most controversial feature of the bonds was their exemption from 
taxes. The first issue was exempt from normal (peacetime) income taxes and from the 
wartime surtax which would be, it was hoped, temporary. The exemption drew 
considerable criticism: The Wilson administration, nominally a progressive democratic 
administration, was raising taxes on the wealthy with one hand, and then creating a huge 
loophole with the other. The surtax exemption for the second and third bonds was 
therefore limited to the interest on the first $5,000.00 worth of bonds at face value. When 
it came to planning the fourth issue, however, concerns about finding a market led to 
backtracking. The limit to the exemption from the surtax was raised to $30,000.00, and   13 
provision was made to extend the surtax exemption to interest on the second and third 
issues, provided specified amounts of the fourth issue were purchased.  
  The coupons were chosen by McAdoo in conjunction with his advisors. They 
represented the yield that McAdoo thought was consistent with the sale of the bonds at 
par. Figure 1 shows these coupons, and the market rates on AAA industrial bonds, 
Moody’s highest rated bonds, and on municipal bonds, which were safe and tax exempt.
10  
It is evident that McAdoo priced the Liberty bonds to sell as financial investments. The 
coupon on the Liberty bonds came within a few basis points of the yield on municipals. 
One can see a slight narrowing of the spread between the coupon and the yield on 
municipals, reflecting the change in the tax status of successive issues. But it is clear, 
even from the start, that McAdoo did not expect that investors would buy bonds that 
yielded far less than comparable assets.
11 His faith in his ability to capitalize patriotism 
was qualified from the start by a realization that the market would be interested first and 
foremost in financial returns. 
 
4. A Natural Experiment 
  The price of the Liberty Bonds can reveal a good deal more about the 
effectiveness of the bond selling campaigns. In equilibrium the net advantages of holding 
                                                 
10
 Municipal bonds were presumed to be exempt from Federal taxes including the 
income tax under an 1895 Supreme Court ruling. However, the recent passage of the 
constitutional amendment authorizing the income tax meant that the question of tax 
exemption might be revisited. (Bogart, et al, 1919, pp. 86-87). 
  
11 
Benjamin Klein’s (1974, 947)  estimates of the competitive yield on deposits was 3.85 
in 1917, 4.89 in 1918, and 4.48 in 1919; again, figures in line with the coupons on the 
liberty bonds.   14 
government bonds must be equal at the margin to the net advantages of holding other 
securities. Thus, we can write the following equation. 
(1)    Il + U(P) + U(S) = Ic 
where  Il is the yield of the Liberty bonds. U(P) is the marginal value to a bond holder of 
the satisfaction from contributing to the war effort;  in other words the utility from being 
patriotic. U(S) is the marginal value to the bond holder of other advantages of holding 
government bonds: their greater security, liquidity, tax advantages, and eligibility as 
security for loans from the Federal Reserve. And Ic is the yield on a private sector 
alternative, for example AAA rated industrial bonds. Thus, the spread between corporates 
and Liberties will tell us about the sacrifice that the marginal investor was willing to 
make in the name of patriotism.  
  The government, of course, can exploit the patriotic motive for buying Liberty 
bonds by issuing more and driving U(P) towards zero. So a finding that Il - Ic is small 
may mean simply that the government has fully exploited the potential of patriotism. For 
this reason the opening and middle of the war do not provide good natural experiments 
with which to test the role played by patriotism.  
  This is illustrated in Figure 2. In the absence of a patriotic demand, the Treasury 
could sell the “initial amount” of bonds (each bearing a coupon of, say, 3.5%) at price A. 
A surge of patriotism, other things equal, would increase demand for these bonds and lift 
the price to B. But if the Treasury fully exploits this surge in demand by increasing 
supply accordingly, the price will remain at A. This is the policy it would follow if it was 
attempting to prevent increases in interest rates, say, to avoid the suggestion, as Pigou put 
it, "that the rich were making a good thing out of the war."     15 
  The end of the war, on the other hand, does provide a natural experiment. Now 
patriotism subsides and the demand curve shifts back to the initial level. But the amount 
of bonds outstanding is not reduced and their price falls to C. History, of course, is not as 
neat as these supply and demand curves suggest. There will be additional issues of bonds 
once the war ends, the patriotic motive for holding bonds will not disappear completely, 
and other events, such as changes in tax rates, will affect returns in the bond market. 
Nevertheless, the response of the bond market to the end of World War I will, we believe, 
yield some important information about the role of patriotism.  
  The main reason that the end of World War I works well as a natural experiment 
is that it marked an abrupt change in economics, politics, and public opinion. Until a few 
months prior to the Armistice the German army was fighting hard and successfully in 
France, and the issue was in doubt.
 12 In the Civil War or World War II, by way of 
contrast, enemy forces were in retreat for a long time before the final end of the war. The 
transition from uncertainty to certainty about victory, in other words, occurred slowly.
13  
  When it came time after the Armistice to issue the Victory Bonds, according to 
Gilbert (1970, 136), “the Treasury was told that there could be no further appeals to 
patriotism and that the problem must be approached in a ‘distinctly cold-blooded 
fashion.’” It is true that some of the old hoopla was rolled out to help sell the Victory 
bonds, but Victory bonds did not have the Committee on Public Information behind 
them. According to the Chair of the Committee, George Creel (1972 [1920], 150), 
                                                 
12 Martin Gilbert (1994, 454 – 96) in two chapters, the “turn of the tide” and “the collapse 
of the central powers,” provides a balanced and detailed account of August through 
November 1918. 
 
13 The campaigns to sell bonds in World War II, described in detail Lawrence R. Samuel 
(1997) excellent account, were even larger than in World War I.    16 
“Within twenty-four hours from the signing of the armistice orders were issued for the 
immediate cessation of every domestic activity of the Committee on Public Information.” 
The Committee on Public Information, moreover, was not an outlier. Virtually the entire 
government apparatus that had been assembled to run the war economy was scrapped the 
moment the war ended, reflecting the public’s desire to get the whole experience over 
with, Lauterbach (1942).  
  The Republicans made strong gains in the fall 1919 Congressional elections, 
winning majorities in both the House and Senate. The issues separating the parties were 
complex, including differences on trade, agricultural, and the proposed League of 
Nations. Nevertheless, it is clear that there was also a general turn away from wartime 
Progressivism, and from wartime demands for patriotic sacrifice.  
  The main economic effect of Republican gains from the point of view of investors 
would be to increase the likelihood that high wartime taxes would be cut soon, reducing 
the progressivity of the income tax. This is what in fact was done under Treasury 
Secretary Mellon in the early 1920s.
14 This change, therefore, would also work toward 
reducing the demand for and increasing the yields on the Liberty bonds, and reducing the 
spread between yields on non-tax-exempt securities and on the Liberty bonds. A finding 
that the yields on Liberty bonds rose, or that the spreads narrowed, would be open to 
multiple interpretations. But a finding that yields and spreads remained steady would 
point strongly toward a small role for wartime patriotism because the effects of the 
Republican ascendancy were working in the same direction as the decline in patriotism. 
                                                 
14 Gene Smiley and Richard H. Keenh (1995) describe the fight over tax rates in the 
1920s.    17 
  In November 1920 Republican Warren G. Harding was elected President in a 
landslide over Democrat James M. Cox. Harding’s victory reiterated the move away from 
wartime Progressivism presaged by the Congressional elections, as suggested by 
Harding’s famous call for “a return to normalcy.” Harding, as we noted above, had 
complained during the war that the campaign for the first Liberty Loan was “hysterical 
and unseemly.” So it was implausible that he would make such appeals in peacetime to 
support the market for Liberty bonds. It is hard to imagine, to sum up, that there were still 
large numbers of investors buying and holding Liberty bonds for patriotic motives after 
Harding's ascendancy.
15 
  Figure 3 plots the yield on the four Liberty bonds before and after the Armistice, 
along with the Municipal bond rate. The lowest line plots the yield to maturity on the 
First Liberty Bonds. The First Liberty bonds fell below par, although only a bit, shortly 
after they were issued (the period in the chart where the yield rises above 3.50). The fall 
may have been due in part to the inherent limits of social pressure. When the bonds were 
offered people could display their patriotism by announcing their purchase and by 
pointedly asking others how many Liberty bonds they have bought. After the initial 
offering, it was hard to prevent people from selling bonds and readjusting their portfolio. 
Few people were likely to go around asking their neighbors how many bonds they had 
sold. Note our third poster which calls on workers to “Buy Liberty Bonds and Keep 
Them” (my italics). Mainly, however, the fall in the price of Liberty bonds was probably 
due to the general rise in rates that can be seen also in the municipal bond rates. 
                                                 
15 The Republican ascendancy might have strengthened confidence in balanced budget and gold standard 
orthodoxies that were good for bonds. But these had been articles of faith for decades and expectations 
about them were unlikely to have been volatile.   18 
  The major difference that tax exemption could make is shown by the large 
spreads between the yields on the First Liberty bonds, which were fully tax exempt, and 
on the second, third, and fourth Liberty bonds, which were partly subject to taxation.  
  The real test of patriotism, however, as we noted above, is what happens after the 
Armistice. If people were holding government bonds mainly for patriotic reasons, we 
would expect them to begin selling them and adjusting their portfolios. If this process 
was well understood by the market, then prices would adjust immediately. The Armistice, 
however, appears to have had a little effect on the yields of the Liberty bonds. The yields 
were remarkably stable for the following year. As noted above, the turn toward the 
Republicans in the 1918 elections might have created expectations of a reduction in the 
high wartime progressivity of the income tax. On these grounds one would expect a 
narrowing of the spread between the yields on the First Liberty bonds, which were fully 
tax exempt, and the yields on subsequent issues which were only partly exempt. But this 
does not seem to have happened, suggesting that the likelihood of sharp cuts still 
appeared low. Figure 3, in other words reveals a calm market; a market that took the end 
of the war in stride.  
  Figure 4 takes a longer view. It plots the returns for the First Liberty bond, for the 
fourth Liberty bond, and for a group of municipal bonds. The rates on all three remained 
stable until the first postwar recession. The yield on the First Liberty bond, moreover, 
varied little after this sharp recession, returning to about the level at issue. Again, there 
seems to be little evidence that a large reservoir of patriotism was being unwound during 
the “return to normalcy.”   19 
  Although Figures 3 and 4 seem to rule out large changes, small changes in the 
spreads between the series are hard to read. For this reason it is useful to look at Figure 5 
which plots the spread between the yields on AAA corporates and on the First Liberty 
loan, and by way of contrast the spread between the yield on BAA corporates and AAA 
corporates. The spread between the corporates and the Liberty Bond should reflect the 
patriotism premium and the safety premium – in other words U(P) + U(S) in equation 
(1). The spread between the BAA and AAA rates reflects a similar difference in risk, call 
it U(S’), but no difference in patriotism.  
  After the armistice the patriotic motive for holding Liberty bonds, if it was 
present, would have declined substantially. Some bond holders may have continued to 
heed Uncle Sam’s plea to hold on to their bonds; but others, surely, would have assumed 
that with the war safely won, they could begin to diversify their portfolios. Therefore, we 
would expect the AAA-First-Liberty-Loan spread to narrow. And consistent with this 
prediction we see a small and brief decline in the spread.  The spread then rose a bit, the 
opposite of what we would expect from a decline in the patriotism premium. The increase 
is clearly associated with the recession of 1920-1921. This recession, although brief, was 
relatively severe, and the rise in the spread probably reflects a rise in default risks 
produced by the recession.  
  The onset of the recession, which the National Bureau dates as January 1920, was 
accompanied by substantial and controversial increases in the discount rate at the Federal 
Reserve in December 1919 and January 1920. The increase in January, from 4.75 percent 
to 6 percent, was unprecedented (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 230-1). There is also a 
small increase in the AAA-Liberty spread in late 1923, probably associated with the   20 
second postwar recession which the National Bureau dates from May 1923 to July 1924. 
Thus it would appear that whatever narrowing of the AAA-Liberty spread occurred over 
the long-run was probably due more to a narrowing risk premium – the cause, 
presumably, of the similar long-run decline in the BAA-AAA spread – rather than of any 
erosion of a large patriotism premium.  
  Our conclusions about the effectiveness of the Liberty bond campaigns based on 
examining the charts can be tested formally. Table 3 shows regressions for the First and 
Fourth Liberty bonds.
16  The regressions include three variables designed to measure 
conditions in financial markets. (1) The AAA rate was included to measure general 
market conditions. (2) The municipal rate was included to measure the effect of the 
postwar reductions in tax rates. (3) The Federal Reserve discount rate was included to 
measure the effect of monetary policy. To measure the impact of the Armistice we tried 
two variables. (1) “Rapid Adjustment” takes the value zero before November 1918 and 
the value one from November 1918 forward. (2) “Gradual Adjustment” starts at .001 in 
November 1918 and rises at a constant rate until it reaches 1.00 in December 1929.
17 
  On economic grounds one would not expect there to be a unit root in the yields. 
There is a zero lower bound on interest rates, and the gold standard, which the United 
States maintained through out, set a limit on the inflation premium. The Augmented 
Dickey Fuller tests, however, perhaps because of their weak power, generally failed to 
reject the hypothesis of a unit root. For that reason we estimated the basic equation over a 
number of samples and in a number of ways to account for the possibility of a unit root, 
                                                 
16 The prices of the second and third Liberty bonds tracked the fourth Liberty bonds closely. The Victory 
loans (the fifth loans) were short-term. 
 
17 We tried several versions of the “gradual adjustment” variable. The results were similar to those reported 
in the tables.    21 
or autocorrelation in the residuals: in levels, first differences, levels with a lagged 
dependent variable, and in levels with an AR(1) adjustment for autocorrelation.
18 
  Table 3a shows the results for the yield on the First Liberty loan for the full 
sample (the results for shorter samples were similar) and for the four estimation methods. 
There is some evidence from the regressions in levels that the Armistice may have had an 
impact: “Rapid Adjustment” is significant when the regression is estimated in levels and 
when an auto-correlation adjustment is included, although not when the dependent 
variable is lagged one period. Gradual Adjustment also turns out to be significant when 
the equation is estimated in levels and when an auto-correlation adjustment is included. 
The coefficients, however, are small. The largest estimate is only 15 basis points. First 
differencing the data produces more plausible coefficients on the fundamentals: the 
coefficient on the AAA rate is positive. When the equation is estimated in first 
differences, however, the coefficients on Rapid Adjustment and Gradual Adjustment are 
small and not significantly different from zero. 
  Table 3b shows the results of similar regressions for the Fourth Liberty loan. 
Rapid adjustment is significant when the equation in levels is estimated with an AR(1) 
adjustment and when the equation is estimated in first differences. Gradual adjustment is 
significant when the equation is estimated in levels without an adjustment for serial 
correlation or when it is estimated in levels and a lagged dependent variable is included. 
But the coefficient is small in all of the equations. The largest estimate, when Gradual 
Adjustment is included in the simple OLS equation in levels, is 23 basis points. The other 
estimates are smaller. 
                                                 
18 Higher order autocorrelation terms were insignificant.   22 
  It is also useful to ask whether the volume of sales changed dramatically with the 
Armistice. Suppose some investors decided to sell their Liberty bonds because they no 
longer had a patriotic reason to hold them, but others decided to buy them, perhaps 
because the latter thought that highly liquid investments made sense until more was 
known about the shape of the postwar economy. Under these assumptions one would see 
little movement in the price of bonds, but lots of movement in the volume of sales. 
  Figure 6 shows the volume of sales for the first and fourth Liberty bonds from 
1917 through 1923. Evidently, the Armistice did not produce a sharp realignment in the 
holding of Liberty bonds. Instead, monthly sales of Liberty bonds settled down to a 
mostly stable rate in the postwar era. The one exception was in December 1920, when 
there was a sharp spike in sales. The New York Times attributed this spike to concerns 
about the revival of the War Finance Corporation (its debt might compete with the 
Liberty bonds) and to income tax considerations (losses had to be realized to count 
against income). The Times thought that many of the income tax sales were being 
matched with purchases.
19 If the Time's interpretation is right it suggests that the volume 
of sales would respond quickly when financial reasons for holding bonds changed. The 
Armistice and the concurrent reduction in the patriotic motive for holding bonds, 
evidently, did not have a similar effect.  
 
5. Sales to Low Income Savers 
  The denominations of the bonds suggest that a large percentage was sold to 
wealthy individuals or institutional investors. Such investors, of course, may well have 
                                                 
19 New York Times, December 17, 1920, p. 33; December 21, 1920, p. 28.   23 
been motivated by patriotism.  But this finding does suggest that McAdoo’s attempt to 
market the Liberty Bonds to working class or middle class investors enjoyed modest 
success, at least as far as the goal of financing the war was concerned.  Table 2 shows a 
snapshot of the denominational structure of the bonds outstanding on June 30, 1920. The 
modal bond was the $1000 bond, which was close to a $50,000 bond in today’s money: 
Possible for a middle class family, but one would think not in large amounts. The smaller 
denominations, $50 and $100, seem more plausible for middle class investors, and 
constituted about 20 percent of the outstanding debt. This does not mean, however, that 
all of these bonds were held by middle class investors. A number of large corporations 
bought these denominations so that they could make dividend payments with them, 
Gilbert (1970, 128). 
  Another attempt to sell war bonds in small denominations to the young and poor 
was modelled on a British program. “War Savings Certificates,” were first issued in 
January 1918. They sold for $4.12 (about $60 in today’s money using the CPI) and were 
worth $5.00 at maturity in January 1923. The price increased one cent per month until 
sales were stopped in December 1918. The interest works out to about 4.5 percent. For 
those who did not have $4.12 on hand, savings stamps costing $.25 could be purchased. 
Each stamp was pasted on a special board, and when the buyer had enough it could be 
exchanged for a war savings certificate. The “War Savings Certificate” under various 
names became a permanent feature of the financial landscape. It was continued after the 
war, used in World War II, and continued in various guises since.   
  The purpose of the war savings certificates in World War I, as in its later 
reincarnations, was to provide a vehicle for people of limited means, especially young   24 
people, to express their patriotism and at the same time to teach them the value of thrift. 
In American high schools young women were encouraged to knit for the war effort, and 
young men to buy savings stamps. The program contributed a modest amount to the 
actual financing of the war. At the end of August 1919, the total amount of debt issued to 
finance the war amounted to $26.4 billion. Of this amount $0.93 billion consisted of war 
savings certificates, about 3.5 percent of the total, (Schultz and Caine 1937, p. 540). It 
could be argued, however, that the War Savings Certificates represented additional real 
savings, as opposed to other issues that were partly monetized, and these were real 
savings that might not otherwise have been available. 
  We can derive an idea of how the portion of bonds purchased by individuals was 
distributed from a government survey of nearly 13,000 households. This survey was 
undertaken because of the concern about how families were being affected by wartime 
inflation. It was coded by Martha Olney (1995) and provides a remarkably detailed 
account of how a representative sample of urban families spent their money during the 
war years. Figure 7 shows the cumulative percentage of the total bond issues purchased 
by the households in the sample when they are arranged by household income. For 
example, the point plotted above 20%, 7.37%, shows that the lowest 20% of the 
households in the sample by income purchased 7.37% of the total amount of bonds 
purchased by all households in the sample. The curve shows the strong relationship 
between income and bond purchases, although it also shows that even the lowest income 
classes were drawn into the program, as McAdoo hoped, and did purchase some bonds.
20  
                                                 
20 The curve includes war stamps with Liberty bonds. Excluding them would not change the visual impact 
of the figure.  
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  The sample coded by Olney, it should be noted, while it was intended to be 
representative of ordinary Americans, did not include the institutions and very wealthy 
individuals who bought most of the bonds. This can be seen from the following 
calculation. The coded sample of households purchased $745,746 worth of Liberty 
bonds.
21 When blown up by an estimate of the total number of households in 1918-1919 
one gets a figure of $1,655,783,620 as the amount purchased by all households. This 
constituted about 7.72 percent of the total amount of Liberty Bonds sold. Therefore, 
about 92.3 percent of the Liberty bonds must have been sold to institutions, such as 
banks, and to very wealthy individuals who were not included in the sample. The lowest 
20 percent of households by income in the sample probably, therefore, purchased about .6 
percent of the total issue (7.37 percent x 7.72 percent), a respectable amount, an amount 
that may have been important for morale by demonstrating their support for the war, but 
clearly not a key to the financing the war.  
  Moreover, showing that relatively poor savers did buy war savings stamps and 
Liberty bonds, does not prove that patriotism was the overriding motive. Wages were up 
and the Liberty Bonds offered a good return compared with savings deposits in banks. 
The Liberty bonds, moreover, could be purchased on an instalment plan. The lowest 
denomination of the Fourth Liberty Bond ($50), for example, could be purchased by 
making a down payment of $4.00 and then paying $2.00 per week for 23 weeks.  
 
6.  How Were Nominal Rates Kept Down During the War? 
                                                 
21 The coded sample also purchased $109,196 in War Savings Stamps.   26 
  If patriotism played a negligible role in increasing the demand for bonds, then 
how were nominal rates kept so low during the war, given the huge increase in the supply 
of bonds, and the rapid inflation? A full accounting is outside the scope of this paper. We 
can, however, suggest several factors that appear to have played a role.  
  (1) As we have already noted, the bonds were exempt from state and local taxes 
and were exempt or partially exempt from Federal taxes. Investors in high tax brackets 
had a strong financial incentive to buy them. During the early 1920s Treasury Secretary 
Andrew Mellon argued that holding tax-exempt bonds by wealthy individuals was a 
major source of tax avoidance, and he argued for cuts in marginal federal tax rates to 
reduce tax avoidance. To be sure, Mellon and his allies were mainly concerned that new 
issues of tax exempt state and municipal bonds would finance projects that would 
compete with private enterprise. But some of the avoidance they sought to reduce may 
have utilized the Liberty bonds. Work by Smiley and Keehn (1995) supports Mellon’s 
argument. 
  (2) The issue of new private bonds was curtailed during the war. A government 
agency, The Capital Issues Committee, was given the authority to prohibit issues that it 
considered inappropriate. But chances are that a considerable amount of private 
investment would have been deferred until after the war in any case because of the 
uncertainties created by the war.  
  (3)  As Allan H. Meltzer (2003, 88-9) has noted, many bond holders may have 
expected the price level to return to its prewar level after the war. The bonds contained a 
gold clause, and it might have been assumed that after the war the world would return to 
the gold standard and that wartime inflation would be wrung from the system as it was   27 
after the Civil War. In other words, investors in Liberty bonds might reasonably have 
expected to gain from postwar deflation. Investors who bought bonds on this expectation 
were in for a disappointment. The price level rose every year from 1914 to 1920. The 
price level then fell during the 1920-21 recession, but the price level never returned to the 
1914 level. Investors who bought Liberty bonds in 1918 and held them until 1929 
experienced a loss from price changes (-2.37 percent per year); investors who bought in 
1919 and held until 1929 experienced a small gain from price changes (+.27 percent per 
year).
22 
  (4) The Federal Reserve directly or indirectly monetized a good portion of the 
new debt.  Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963, 216) put it this way. 
The Federal Reserve became to all intents and purposes the bond-selling 
window of the Treasury, using its monetary powers almost exclusively to that 
end. Although no “greenbacks” were printed, the same result was achieved 
by more indirect methods using Federal Reserve notes and Federal Reserve 
deposits. 
 
  How much was involved? Between June of 1916 and June of 1919, the Federal 
Debt increased by $24.3 billion (from $1.2 billion to $25.5billion). High-powered money 
(which includes mainly Federal Reserve notes and deposits) increased by $2.1 billion, 
according to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 801-2). So the increase in high-powered 
money could account only for about 10% of the increase in the Federal debt.  
  But commercial banks also contributed to the monetization of the debt. They did 
so by purchasing bonds for their own portfolios and by lending money that borrowers 
then used to purchase bonds. Generally the banks lent at the coupon rate or at a slight 
advance over the coupon rate. Obviously, these were relatively secure loans since the 
                                                 
22 The price level used in the calculations is the GDP deflator from (Johnston and Williamson, 2002) which 
is based on Balke and Gordon (1989). 
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Liberty bonds were essentially the collateral for the loan. Since the amount of bonds 
purchased with newly created money was not matched one for one by bonds held by 
banks, we cannot produce an accurate estimate of how much of the debt was monetized 
by examining the balance sheets of the banks.   
  We can get some sense of the upper bound, however, by looking at the increase in 
the total stock of money and assuming that all of the money that was created was backed 
directly or indirectly by government bonds. The increases for M1, M2, M3, and M4, from 
June 1917 to June 1919 were $7.03 billion, $10.02 billion, $10.68, and $11.46 billion 
respectively, (Friedman and Schwartz 1970, 15-17). These figures imply estimates of the 
share of the increase in the debt that was monetized ranging from 29 percent (M1) 
through 41 percent (M2), and 44 percent (M3), to 47 percent (M4). Roughly speaking M1 
includes demand deposits in commercial banks, M2 adds time deposits in commercial 
banks, M3 adds postal savings deposits and mutual savings bank deposits, and M4 adds 
savings and loan shares. Thus, as we move to more inclusive definitions of money we 
may be including institutions that were less involved in the process of monetizing 
government debt. Nevertheless, it would appear that as much as 40 percent of the debt 
was monetized.  For the first year of the war (June 1917 to June 1918) the estimates of 
the share of the debt monetized range from 35 percent (M1), through 49 percent (M2), 
and 52 percent (M3), to 64 percent (M4). 
  (5) As Robert Barro's model of Ricardian equivalence suggests, savings may have 
risen in anticipation of future taxes. Paul Evans (1986) drew attention to the stability of 
rates in World War I, and other American wars, and suggested, tentatively, that the best   29 
explanation of the stability of rates during the war would need to make use of the ideas 
suggested by Ricardian equivalence. 
  Secretary McAdoo argued that his policies, including capitalizing patriotism, had 
saved taxpayers millions compared with allowing interest rates to rise to market clearing 
levels, (McAdoo 1931, p. 381). The economics of this claim, however, was dubious, even 
leaving aside the magnitude of the savings. It sounds like a simple saving of resources: 
Like eliminating red tape or firing incompetent workers. In fact, the savings, to the extent 
that they were there, were transfers of dubious legitimacy. By persuading factory workers 
and Boy Scouts to buy bonds, the government was able to lower the future interest 
payments paid by the government. Those interest payments would be made from tax 
revenues, and to the extent that those taxes would have been paid by the wealthy, the net 
effect was a transfer from the Boy Scouts to the wealthy. To be sure, this argument 
assumes that workers and Boy Scouts would have found some other way of spending 
their money that would have added more to their welfare. A case could be made that it 
was really in the interest of workers and Boy Scouts to save more. Nevertheless, the 
avowed purpose of the Progressives was to shift the burden of taxation to the wealthy, 
and the policy of capitalizing patriotism undermined this policy.  
  This was apparent to many observers when it came to making the bonds tax 
exempt. In this case it was obvious that what the Treasury gained from lower interest 
rates, it lost from lower tax revenues. For taxpayers at the margin, that is taxpayers who 
were indifferent between holding taxable and non-taxable bonds, the gain from 
exemption would just offset the loss from lower rates. However, for taxpayers in very 
high tax brackets the gains from tax exemption could be substantial. An example will   30 
make this clear. In January 1920 AAA corporate bonds were yielding 5.55 percent, and 
the First Liberty bonds were yielding 3.60 percent. Therefore, someone in a 35 percent 
bracket would have been indifferent between the securities as far as after-tax yield was 
concerned (5.55*[1-.35]   3.60). The highest bracket in 1920, however, was 73 percent 
for taxpayers earning more than one million. For them, First Liberty bonds were 
equivalent to taxable bonds yielding 13.33 percent, higher than the yield on many junk 
bonds (13.33*[1-.73]   3.60).
23 To be sure, there already existed a fairly safe tax-exempt 
alternative to Liberty bonds: municipal bonds. The municipals might have gained more 
from the imposition of very high tax rates during the war if the Liberty bonds had been 
taxable. Taking the sting out of very high tax brackets and punishing municipalities were 
not, one would think, major Progressive priorities. 
 
7.  Then Why Do It? 
  It appears that appeals to patriotism had a small effect on the financing of the war, 
and that the attempt to conceal the limited effect of patriotism led to the adoption of tax 
exemptions that undermined Progressive redistributive priorities. Then why do it? Why 
enlist everyone from actress Mary Pickford to evangelist Billy Sunday to sell bonds? 
There appear to have been a number of reasons.  
  (1) “Everyone else was doing it.” Germany had been the first, it appears, to use a 
massive public drive to help sell bonds. In Britain the Treasury mocked the first German 
drive – it showed how desperate the German’s were – but later adopted similar tactics. 
Eventually, the German Treasury returned the favor and mocked the circus atmosphere in 
                                                 
23 U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1095).   31 
which bonds were being sold in Britain, (Noyes 1970, 181-2). Following suit made a 
good deal of sense. Presumably the British and the Germans had found the best way to do 
things. And since the United States had a larger population and a larger economy than the 
Germans, following the same policies minimized the chance that mistakes would offset 
these clear cut advantages. 
  (2) It might have worked. This was a Progressive Democratic administration 
going to war in an era when the belief in the primacy of market forces was under attack. 
It is hardly surprising that Wilson, McAdoo, and their associates would have believed 
that patriotism could move mountains. The contrast between the Civil War and World 
War I is particularly telling on this point. Salmon Chase believed passionately in the 
cause of the Union, but it did not occur to him that he could expand the market for bonds 
except by appealing to the self-interest of the buyers. If successful in encouraging 
savings, the WWI campaigns would have reduced the tendency of people to dump private 
securities to buy war bonds. Capital losses on individual private security holdings, even if 
not widespread, would have created problems for individual investors and for 
institutional holders such as banks, trust companies, and insurance companies. 
  (3) It cost little to stir up patriotism and every little bit extra savings it brought in 
seemed a plus. The Boy Scouts and other sellers and purchasers of small certificates are a 
good example. They didn’t contribute much to the overall financing of the war. Still, 
every little bit helped.  
  (4) There was that important but mysterious factor that goes under the name of 
“morale.” Buying bonds, and urging others to buy them, allowed people to feel that they 
were participating in the war effort.  The bond buying campaigns also allowed racial and   32 
ethnic minorities to reveal their patriotism, which may helped ease inter-group tensions 
both during and after the war. The bond rallies and similar forms of support, moreover, 
were a visible sign to the armed forces, and to our enemies, of the public’s support for the 
war. Less specific rallies in support of the war might have had similar effects, but rallies 
at which people pledged to buy bonds may have carried more weight.
24  
  (5) The structure of the bond issues, a series of five highly publicized sales of 
specific amounts, introduced a discontinuity in the significance of the amount sold. If the 
government offers to sell $1000 worth of bonds, it would seem to matter little from a 
purely financial point of view whether the public offers to buy $999 or $1001. But in the 
first case the issue is a failure and in the second case a success. The first case shows a 
lack of public support for the war, and the second enthusiasm -- the issue has been 
“oversubscribed.” Patriotic rallies that raise demand “only” from $999 to $1001 therefore 
could have a large influence on the how the issue was perceived both domestically and 
abroad. The investment banker Thomas W. Lamont made this point when he addressed a 
bond rally. 
  Germany is watching to see whether we are going to make a mighty effort on the 
  very first step of the war. She is going to gauge our ability to fight in the trenches 
  by the  way we take hold of this loan. (New York Times, June 2, 1917, 3)  
 
  This aspect of the problem was also on McAdoo’s mind. As he noted in his 
Memoirs when recalling his thinking prior to the issue of the first Liberty Loan: 
Suppose hundreds of millions of the bonds were left on our hands? The moral 
effect of such a failure would be equal to a crushing military disaster. It 
would not only dishearten our own people, but also the nations across the sea 
whose fortunes were joined to ours; and it would give our enemies new 
confidence and courage. (McAdoo 1931, 380). 
                                                 
24 Samuel (1997) covers this aspect of the World War II bond campaigns. We are not aware of an equally 
thorough study of this aspect of the World War I campaigns.   33 
  Although McAdoo professed to fear a shortfall of hundreds of millions, it is 
obvious that any shortfall would have produced a public relations problem. Cheering at 
bond rallies appears then to have been a bit like cheering at basketball games. Cheering 
for the home team, part of the “home court advantage,” may add only a few points to a 
team’s score. But every little bit helps, and it may mean the difference between winning 
and losing. 
  Economists and economic historians are often reproached, with some 
justification, for putting too much weight on pecuniary motives. Deirdre McCloskey 
(1998), for one, has provided a long list of economic activities that she believes cannot be 
understood without bringing in concepts such as shame and social solidarity. Major wars 
provide natural laboratories in which to test the primacy of financial incentives because 
major wars inevitably bring a chorus of demands for sacrifices to ensure victory. A close 
look at the Liberty Bonds, however, suggests that in the field of finance the economist’s 
confidence in the primacy of financial incentives is well taken.
25 
                                                 
25 McCloskey (1998, 309) anticipated this conclusion. On the foreign exchanges, she suggests, pecuniary 
motives dominate.    34 
 
 
Table 1. The Properties of the Liberty Bonds and The Results of the Campaigns 
 































































































































































































Interest on the second, 
third, and fourth 
issues exempt on the 
minimum of 3 times 
the amount of notes 
purchased or $20,000 
Common 
Features 
(1) Interest and Principal were payable in gold coin. (2) The bonds lacked 
the “circulation privilege.” In other words, National Banks could not use 
them as backing for bank notes. (3) Banks could use the bonds as collateral 
for loans from the Federal Reserve. (4) The bonds could be bought on 
“instalment plans” extending over several months. (5) The bonds were 
exempt from state and local taxes. (6) The bonds were not exempt from 
estate and inheritance taxes. However, interest and par value of the 
principal could be used to pay Federal estate and inheritance taxes 
provided the bonds were purchased six months prior to death and had a 
coupon of 4 percent or more. The bonds were regularly used in this way 
after the war, although up to 1925 the losses to the Treasury on this 
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$759  491  227  306  445 
Share of the 
Issue in 
denominations 




42%  40  66  52  60 
 
 
Sources: Schultz and Caine (1937, 533-41); Dewey (1931, 502-510); Gilbert (1970), 
passim; New York Times, passim. 
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Table 2. Denominations of the Liberty Bonds Outstanding on June 30, 1920 
 




Amount  Percentage of all 
bonds outstanding 
$50  $2,320  $1,522839,700  7.87 
100  4,640  2,343,647,200  12.11 
500  23,198  1,805,738,000  9.33 
1,000  46,396  8,028,471,000  41.49 
5,000  231,978  1,399,860,000  7.23 
10,000  463,956  3,115,310,000  16.10 
50,000  2,319,780  255,850,000  1.32 
100,000  4,639,560  879,300,000  4.54 
Total    19,351,015,900  100 
a 
We used per capita real GDP, available at www.eh.net, as the inflator, to convey how 
hard it would be for the average person to buy one of the bonds. 
 
Source: Gilbert (1970, 141). 
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1.371    -0.253  0.690  0.093  0.082      0.910  1.003 
(10.373)    (-8.090)  (11.734)  (5.449)  (3.124)         
1.596    -0.203  0.566  0.120    0.047    0.905  0.905 




-0.010    0.190  0.151  0.073  0.011      0.167  2.322 
(-0.637)    (2.253)  (1.623)  (2.715)  (0.675)         
0.001    0.183  0.153  0.073    -0.010    0.165  2.322 




0.766  0.535  -0.091  0.245  0.061  0.017      0.933  1.729 
(5.526)  (7.454)  (-2.649)  (3.148)  (4.052)  (0.708)         
0.750  0.550  -0.055  0.197  0.060    0.035    0.933  1.742 




1.518    0.075  0.280  0.079  0.106    0.781  0.937  2.128 
(6.199)    (0.986)  (2.856)  (3.223)  (1.922)    (12.943)     
1.542    0.061  0.298  0.088    0.153  0.700  0.937  2.024 
(7.275)    (0.809)  (3.212)  (3.737)    (1.929)  (10.274)     
 
Sources: See the Appendix. 
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1.215    0.328  0.258  0.093  -0.079      0.941  0.628 
(7.191)    (8.286)  (3.448)  (4.271)  (-1.657)         
0.701    0.525  0.183  0.034    0.232    0.949  0.730 




-0.069    0.255  0.184  0.071  0.068      0.222  2.322 
(-1.832)    (2.693)  (1.791)  (2.462)  (1.800)         
-0.001    0.273  0.170  0.065    -0.005    0.203  2.311 




0.450  0.780  0.138  -0.093  0.042  0.013      0.961  1.704 
(2.693)  (8.013)  (3.443)  (-1.234)  (2.180)  (0.296)         
0.375  0.680  0.262  -0.105  0.026    0.117    0.963  1.670 




1.067    0.359  0.214  0.084  0.140    0.720  0.971  2.105 
(4.387)    (5.373)  (2.216)  (3.262)  (1.992)    (11.677)     
1.124    0.397  0.187  0.082    0.094  0.669  0.970  2.017 
(4.532)    (5.038)  (1.960)  (3.044)    (1.114)  (9.123)     
 
Sources: See the Appendix. 
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Louis Raemaekers. After a Zeppelin raid in London: “But Mother Had Done Nothing Wrong, 
Had She, Daddy?” Prevent this in New York: Invest in Liberty Bonds. 19" x 12."  
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Louis Raemaekers. Will you be ready to-morrow to make munitions for Germany? If not: invest 
in Liberty bonds to-day. [1917?] 19" x 12." From the Rutgers University collection of Liberty 
Bond Posters, accessed October 5, 2005. 
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. 
F. Strathmann. Beat Back the Hun with Liberty Bonds. Maurice F.V. Doll, "The Poster War: 
Allied Propaganda of the First World War." The Provincial Museum of Alberta, 











































Anonymous. Let Uncle Sam take this–and he will pay back this–All he asks you to do is keep 
your bond: Buy Liberty bonds and keep them: Ask your foreman. [1918]. 17 5/8" x 11 ¾." From 
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Figure 1   
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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  Figure 7 
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Appendix 
  The Aaa bond rate is the Yield on High Grade Industrial Bonds, Aaa Rating, NBER 
series m13026.  The Municipal bond rate is the Index of Yields of High Grade Municipal Bonds, 
NBER series m13023. The Federal Reserve discount rate is the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Discount Rate, series m13009. These series are available at www.nber.org. The yields and 
sales volumes for the Liberty bonds were compiled from the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle. To compute the yields we used end of month prices and the Excel yield to maturity 




Yields to Maturity of the First and Fourth Liberty Loans, 1917-1929 
 
 
The First Liberty Loan (3.50% maturing in 1947) 
 
  Jan.  Feb.  March   April   May  June  July   Aug.  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec. 
1917  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3.499  3.511  3.503  3.500  3.508  3.558  3.576 
1918  3.610  3.612  3.557  3.551  3.507  3.526  3.509  3.413  3.493  3.503  3.555  3.528 
1919  3.556  3.522  3.550  3.574  3.528  3.533  3.523  3.502  3.500  3.461  3.505  3.492 
1920  3.600  3.832  3.679  3.991  3.998  4.057  3.994  4.117  4.041  3.896  4.049  4.050 
1921  3.993  4.046  4.099  4.206  4.291  4.345  4.276  4.234  4.235  3.955  3.712  3.804 
1922  3.786  3.676  3.601  3.535  3.500  3.495  3.449  3.449  3.460  3.469  3.495  3.440 
1923  3.408  3.428  3.443  3.419  3.456  3.471  3.494  3.500  3.540  3.517  3.504  3.550 
1924  3.543  3.560  3.568  3.519  3.500  3.415  3.414  3.461  3.445  3.427  3.454  3.437 
1925  3.405  3.395  3.418  3.385  3.436  3.438  3.454  3.446  3.496  3.536  3.514  3.527 
1926  3.496  3.430  3.442  3.452  3.452  3.405  3.413  3.425  3.479  3.470  3.475  3.420 
1927  3.410  3.395  3.430  3.434  3.434  3.440  3.440  3.425  3.399  3.401  3.416  3.388 
1928  3.375  3.389  3.417  3.410  3.462  3.495  3.504  3.542  3.615  3.561  3.527  3.509 
1929  3.578  3.654  3.694  3.657  3.782  3.773  3.716  3.693  3.713  3.728  3.566  3.538 
 
The Fourth Liberty Loan (4.25% maturing in 1948) 
 
1918  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  4.595  4.593  4.519  4.409  4.384  4.461 
1919  4.524  4.562  4.583  4.509  4.510  4.510  4.585  4.612  4.522  4.553  4.624  4.668 
1920  4.805  4.841  4.856  5.240  5.074  5.231  5.251  5.282  5.065  4.943  5.151  5.245 
1921  5.131  5.151  5.115  5.117  5.121  5.144  5.093  5.085  4.866  4.710  4.418  4.440 
1922  4.486  4.433  4.344  4.273  4.250  4.236  4.160  4.221  4.251  4.352  4.327  4.310 
1923  4.360  4.389  4.425  4.425  4.352  4.375  4.380  4.365  4.361  4.399  4.374  4.366 
1924  4.290  4.307  4.273  4.243  4.201  4.106  4.090  4.126  4.082  4.074  4.125  4.148 
1925  4.117  4.139  4.137  4.111  4.092  4.069  4.117  4.104  4.120  4.120  4.126  4.130 
1926  4.107  4.108  4.095  4.067  4.068  4.077  4.100  4.113  4.121  4.084  4.070  4.063   52 
1927  4.015  4.008  4.007  4.019  4.059  4.032  4.014  4.017  4.016  3.998  3.973  3.997 
1928  4.030  4.034  4.056  4.128  4.114  4.123  4.116  4.174  4.167  4.188  4.233  4.235 
1929  4.248  4.264  4.360  4.284  4.336  4.326  4.329  4.344  4.384  4.297  4.180  4.156 
 
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues. 
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